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An Investigation of Luther’s View of the
Bondage of the Will with Implications for
Soteriology and Theodicy
John Peckham
Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary,
Andrews University

Martin Luther sparked one of the greatest movements of Christian
history when he challenged tenets of the Catholic faith in 1517, and his
influence is still very strong.1 One of Luther’s major contributions to
theology was his emphasis on grace. This was extracted from the writings of Paul and also influenced by the works of the great church father
Augustine. This paper endeavors to look at Luther’s view of the human
will in the context of his soteriology of grace. Specifically, what is Luther’s conception of the freedom of the will? Does the human nature
have any such thing as free will in its post-fall state? Moreover, how
does Luther define the process of salvation? In other words, why are
some saved and others lost? These and other questions must be addressed
from Luther’s perspective. Luther lays out his views on the will of God
and the will of man in a polemic against the viewpoints of Desiderius
Erasmus in the book, The Bondage of the Will. Therein, Luther’s soteriology is made explicit. This paper will look at Luther’s theology and
interact with it from a biblical perspective with the purpose of expositing
Luther’s theology of the will. The coherence or incoherence of Luther’s
theology of the human will is also of great importance to this study. The
issue of the will also bears heavily on the ability to uphold the goodness
1

Jaroslav Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700), 5 vols., The
Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (Chicago: U of Chicago
P, 1984), 4:139.
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and justice of God. How does Luther’s approach integrate with some
biblical passages on the nature of God and the nature of salvation?
Martin Luther’s famous struggle and arduous trial (Anfechtung) over
his own salvation through works brought him to the conclusion that “by
his own understanding or strength he could not believe in Jesus Christ or
come to him.”2 Luther was “very troubled by the idea of iustitia Dei, the
‘righteousness of God.’”3 He thought of God as a completely impartial
judge, a dispassionate umpire. He states, “I did not love, yes, I hated the
righteous God who punishes sinners . . .”4 Thus Luther became certain
that he could not be saved.5 Accordingly, the promise of salvation was
bitter, it was “as if God had promised a blind man a million dollars, provided that he could see.”6 Luther struggled long and arduously, but finally found light. He discovered that the righteousness of God is not His
just condemnation of sinners but “the righteousness which is given to us
so that we may meet that precondition.”7 Luther then spent a career
preaching the grace of God. The primacy of grace thus became fundamental to his Christian belief. So when the issue of free will was raised,
Luther saw it as a great threat to his doctrine of salvation. His position is
laid out clearly in his dispute with Erasmus entitled The Bondage of the
Will (De servo arbitrio). He always considered this a very important
work, saying “‘none of my works is worth anything except’ the catechism and De servo arbitrio.”8
It is important to understand the context of this work before Luther’s
arguments are examined. The opponent of Luther was a towering
scholar.9 Erasmus originally was a supporter of Luther’s and had called
for reforms himself. However, as things heated up, he felt that he needed
to distance himself. By speaking out against predestination, Erasmus
“would be able to separate himself from the reformer without rejecting
2

Robert Kolb, Bound Choice, Election, and Wittenberg Theological Method: From
Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 11.
3
Alister McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction (New York: Blackwell,
1988), 93.
4
Martin Luther, Career of the Reformer IV, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald,
and Helmut T. Lehmann, Luther’s Works (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 34:336.
5
McGrath, 93.
6
Ibid., 94.
7
Ibid., 100.
8
Kolb, 15.
9
“If any figure stands head and shoulders above other northern European humanists
. . . it was Erasmus of Rotterdam” (McGrath, 53). Erasmus is also famous for his compilation of the New Testament in the original Greek.
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his own call for reform.”10 Luther, on the other hand, considered Erasmus to be merely a “moralist” or a proponent of “works-piety”11 and
thought that “Erasmus had no notion of the nature of the gospel.”12 This
made Luther less likely to consider Erasmus’ view on its merits. They
also disagreed on the interpretation of Scripture. Gerhard O. Forde represents Erasmus’ method as a “box score” method, whereas Luther might
rely on just “one passage” to convince of truth.13 Erasmus also held the
view that Scripture should be interpreted carefully by trained scholars,
whereas Luther thought the Bible should interpret itself and that everyone should read it for themselves.14 Their concerns over the application
of Scripture were likewise at odds. As will be seen shortly, their definition of the very meaning of terms was often very different, and thus they
often “talked past each other.”15 The tone of the argument is often quite
strong and argumentative. However, it must be understood that polemic
was a commonly accepted style of writing, and thus the words of Luther
may seem harsher to the contemporary reader than they really are. 16
Moreover, this was more than an academic dispute to Luther, it was a

10

Kolb, 12.
Harry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong?: An Ecumenical-Theological Study
of Luther’s Major Work, the Bondage of the Will (New York: Newman, 1969), 287.
12
Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought, 3 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon,
1987), 3:56. For an interesting early 20th century analysis of Luther and Erasmus, see
Robert H. Murray, Erasmus and Luther: Their Attitude to Toleration (London: Society
for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1920).
13
Gerhard O. Forde, The Captivation of the Will: Luther Vs. Erasmus on Freedom
and Bondage (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 24.
14
Kolb, 22.
15
Kolb, 24.
16
Ibid., 17. Gerrish refers to “Luther’s cheerful truculence and fondness for overstatement [which] may have appeared to make predestination a bone of contention between Rome and Wittenberg” (Brian A. Gerrish, “Sovereign Grace: Is Reformed Theology Obsolete?” Interpretation 57/1 [2003]: 55). McSorley states that at this time “an
opponent was read not in order to understand him, but to refute him!” (McSorley, 287).
11
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matter of Christian warfare.17 Based on this belief, “Luther was driven by
his concern for terrified consciences.”18
Luther’s Concept of Free Will
Definition of Free Will. Martin Luther states the prime question of
“whether God foresees anything contingently, or whether we do all
things of necessity.”19 In his answer he defines “free will” by saying, “all
who hear mention of ‘free-will’ take it to mean . . . a will that can and
does do, God-ward, all that it pleases, restrained by no law and no command; for you would not call a slave, who acts at the beck of his lord,
free.”20 Thus, for Luther, the term free will delineates a will that is able
to do just about anything.21 Conversely, Erasmus defines his view by
saying, “By free choice in this place we mean a power of the human will
by which a man can apply himself to the things which lead to eternal
salvation, or turn away from them.”22 This definition clearly allows
power to the human will, especially in matters of salvation.23 These
conflicting definitions continue to be problematic throughout the
debate.24
17

Kolb notes that “Luther was certain that their exchange was part of the final combat between God and the devil. The warfare between God and Satan took place throughout human history in the clash of God’s truth with the devil’s lies, and Luther sensed the
end of history at hand, when only an intensification of the conflict could be expected”
(Kolb, 18). For a study of Luther’s view of reason, philosophy, and scholasticism, see
Brian A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962).
18
Kolb, 23.
19
Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. O. R. Johnston (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 2003), 79.
20
Ibid., 137.
21
This is an extreme definition of freedom of will that would be very difficult to defend. In effect, one would have to be omnipotent to have free will, which is why Luther
holds that only God has free will. However, this definition is not the one defended by
advocates of free will, even though it is the one Luther argues against most often, as we
will see.
22
Desiderius Erasmus, “De Libero Arbitrio,” in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and
Salvation, ed. E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969),
47.
23
However, it is not clear what the phrase “apply himself” entails. Luther found
Erasmus’ view incoherent because it “leaves man effort and endeavour, but does not
leave him anything that he may ascribe to his own strength” (Luther, The Bondage of the
Will, 144). It is true that Erasmus’ view is historically viewed as inconsistent, and it need
not be defended here. For an excellent discussion of Erasmus’ own struggle between
contradictions during his debate with Luther, see James D. Tracy, “Two Erasmuses, Two
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Another important distinction for understanding Luther’s position is
his definition of contingency and necessity. First, Luther clarifies that
“being done contingently does not, in Latin, signify that the thing done is
itself contingent, but that it is done by a contingent and mutable will—
such as is not to be found in God.”25 On the other hand, Luther says that
“necessity . . . cannot accurately be used of either man’s will or God’s.”26
Luther does, however, speak of a “necessity of immutability.” He writes
that the human will is not compelled: “I did not say ‘of compulsion’; I
meant, by a necessity, not of compulsion, but of what they call immutability.”27 By this he means one acts “spontaneously and voluntarily. And
this willingness or volition is something which he cannot in his own
strength eliminate, restain or alter.”28 Thus, all that occurs, including the
Luthers: Erasmus’ Strategy in Defense of De Libero Arbitrio,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 78 (1987): 37-60.
24
This effectively limits any constructive dialogue on the subject. For, in the definitions themselves there is given no ground between an absolutely free will as previously
defined and a will that is enslaved. Thus, it seems one must be a Pelagian or a determinist.
25
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 81. He states also on contingency, “If the will of
God were such that, when the work had been done and while it yet remained in being, the
will ceased . . . then it could be truly said that things happen contingently and mutably”
(Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 81). Thus, since God is absolutely immutable for Luther, He cannot do anything “mutably” or contingently. This not only denies freedom to
humans, but by implication to God himself. And because God is omnipotent, everything
must happen necessarily, even though Luther would not utilize this terminology. For a
discussion of the problem of the classical conception of divine immutability, see Bruce
A. Ware, “An Evangelical Reexamination of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God,"
(1984; Dissertation presented to Fuller Theological Seminary). See also an interesting
perspective in Isaak August Dorner, Divine Immutability: A Critical Reconsideration,
trans. Robert R. Williams and Claude Welch (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994).
26
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 81. McSorley contends that “Luther did not
really grasp the distinction of the two kinds of necessity” (McSorley, 317).
27
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 102. He maintains paradoxically that “The will,
whether it be God’s or man’s, does what it does, good or bad, under no compulsion, but
just as it wants or pleases, as if totally free” (Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 81). This is
what is now called compatibilism, or sometimes monergism. For an excellent introduction to monergism, see Terrence L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?: Reassessing Salvation
in Christ and World Religions (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004). For an excellent
discussion of the issues and a moderate Calvinist view, see Norman Geisler, Chosen but
Free (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1999). For an excellent and thorough collection of
the contemporary debate on free will, see Robert Kane, ed., The Oxford Handbook of
Free Will (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002).
28
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 102. Here again it seems Luther is really talking
about power, or potency. That one cannot do something for lack of power does not neces-
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will of man, is under necessity based on the immutability of God’s will
and God’s decree, yet paradoxically the will is not compelled.
The Will of Humanity. Based on these definitions, Luther’s view of
the human will is clarified. According to Luther, there is a will in man,
but it is not free. “You are no doubt right in assigning to man a will of
some sort, but to credit him with a will that is free in the things of God is
too much.”29 The term “free” makes the will too powerful. He reacts to
any conception of this free will by saying, “what is here left to grace and
the Holy Ghost? This is plainly to ascribe divinity to ‘free-will’!”30 But
for Luther the will is not neutral; rather, because of sin, it is in total
bondage. Luther therefore rejects free will due to its implication of a neutral will that denies human sinfulness.31
Luther does qualify this rejection. “I am not speaking of ‘natural being’, but of ‘gracious being’, as they call it. I know that ‘free-will’ can do
some things by nature; it can eat, drink, beget, rule, etc.”32 Forde thus
claims Luther is not teaching determinism writing, “It is something more
sarily mean that one has no free will, especially if there were allowed a supplementary
source of power, such as a prevenient grace. He further defines the term by saying, “This
is what we mean by necessity of immutability: that the will cannot change itself, nor give
itself another bent, but rather, is the more provoked to crave the more it is opposed, as its
chafing proves; for this would not occur, were it free or had ‘free-will’” (Luther, The
Bondage of the Will, 103).
29
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 137. Luther is very concerned about upholding
the sovereignty of God. This may have influenced his conception of the human will.
30
Ibid., 140. It seems that the problem here lies primarily in the definition of free
will. Erasmus has not argued for a conception of an omnipotent will, and he does not
deny a place to the Holy Spirit. But Luther sees no middle ground that preserves his concept of God’s sovereignty and grace.
31
Gonzalez, 56. B. A. Gerrish notes that for Luther, “God has taken salvation out of
the control of our wills and has placed it under the control of his. It is but a short step
from here to a full-blown doctrine of divine determinism” (Brian A. Gerrish, The Old
Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage [Chicago: U of Chicago
P, 1982], 135).
32
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 265. This seems to contradict some other statements. We will look at the internal coherence of Luther’s view in a subsequent section.
Moreover, the Loci Communes, written by Luther’s companion Philip Melanchthon early
in his career, makes it explicit that “If you relate human will (voluntas) to predestination,
there is freedom neither in external nor internal acts, but all things take place according to
divine determination” (Philip Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” in Melanchthon and
Bucer, ed. Wilhelm Pauck [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969], 30). Thus, Melancthon
makes clear that whether you speak of voluntas or arbitrium, there is no freedom in either
when one holds that all takes place by divine determination. Melanchthon later revised
his views on free will.
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like an addiction. We all do what we want to do! That is precisely our
bondage. We are not jerked around by a transcendent puppeteer.”33 At
the same time, Luther paradoxically holds that everything happens according to necessity of God’s immutability. Moreover, when it pertains
to matters of salvation Luther unequivocally denies any role to the human will. When Erasmus questions what man would endeavor to repent
if he were certain he had no free will. Luther replies “Nobody [will reform his life]! Nobody can! God has not time for your practitioners of
self-reformation, for they are hypocrites. The elect, who fear God, will
be reformed by His Holy Spirit.”34 Here we can see the strength of Luther’s sola gratia. For Luther, only God controls the will of man.35
Moreover, God as the Creator meant “that God’s willing creates an absolute necessity embracing all of his creation.”36
The Will as Beast Ridden. Luther states unequivocally that “in all
that bears on salvation or damnation, [man] has no ‘free-will,’ but is a
captive, prisoner and bondslave, either to the will of God, or to the will
of Satan.”37 He goes on to say, “For if a man has lost his freedom, and is
33

Forde, 37. McSorley agrees, saying that Luther’s position is “not really a denial of
man’s natural free will” (McSorley, 327). This is due to Luther’s position that man is free
in immaterial matters but bound in matters of salvation.
34
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 99. Moreover, Luther has clearly espoused that
everything happens according to necessity by the will of God. Thus, even if we are doing
“what we want to do,” it is still God who controls the will and controls all events. Thus, if
we are not puppets, we are still seemingly like a computer that runs on software that is
pre-programmed.
35
He cites selected biblical verses to support this position. Among them are those
that speak of God directing man’s steps, preparing hearts, and holding the power of salvation (Jer 10:23; Prov 16:1; Rom 3:16).
36
Kolb, 26, 29. Further, Luther was influenced toward this absoluteness of God’s
will while studying at Erfurt, especially by Gabriel Biel, where he “assimilated a definition of God as the almighty Creator, who according to his absolute power could do anything he pleases, who conformed to no external standard, who defined the Good by his
Word or covenant.” Yet, he rejected Biel and Ockham’s view of human responsibility
that gave some part to the will in salvation. McSorley contends that this position is not
solely from Scripture but also includes “philosophical or metaphysical thinking,” thus he
cannot claim to argue solely from Scripture (McSorley, 311).
37
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 107. The inclusion of the possibility of being in
bondage to Satan raises a question regarding the will of God and that of Satan. This problem will be taken up in a subsequent section. For a philosophical discussion of foreknowledge and free will, see Ted A. Warfield, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are Compatible,” Nous 31/1 (1997): 80-86. See also the critique of Warfield’s view
by Anthony Brueckner, “On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom,” Faith and Philophy 17/1 (2000): 132-148.
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forced to serve sin, and cannot will good, what conclusion can more
justly be drawn concerning him, than that he sins and wills necessarily?”38 Elsewhere Luther holds that no man has any power to change his
will, for “God does not lie, but does all things immutably, and that his
will can neither be resisted nor changed nor hindered.” 39 Luther compares this captive will to a beast with either God or Satan as its rider. “If
Satan rides, it goes where Satan wills. If God rides, it goes where God
wills. In either case there is no ‘free choice.’”40 Yet, sin is still not God’s
fault, for “the rider [God] of the horse is not responsible for the lameness
which gives him a bad ride.”41 Moreover, under Satan’s sway man’s
“reason (ratio) is blinded; his will (voluntas) is hostile to God; he wants
only to sin; and his choice (arbitrium) is always sinful.”42 Thus, the will
is bound to the will of its rider and can do nothing about it.43
Erasmus questions Luther’s view and notes the “‘paradox that all we
do is done, not by ‘free-will’ but of mere necessity and Augustine’s view
that God works in us both good and evil; that He rewards His own good
works in us, and punishes His own evil works in us?”44 Erasmus goes on
“‘What a flood-gate of iniquity . . . would the spread of such news open
to the people! What wicked man would amend his life? Who would believe that God loved him? Who would fight against his flesh?”45 Despite
38

Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 149. Luther uses the word “forced” here, yet
elsewhere he claims the will is not compelled.
39
Martin Luther, Career of the Reformer III, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald,
and Helmut T. Lehmann, Luther’s Works (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 33:42. On Luther’s view of choice, Kolb comments, “the reformer fashioned this new universe out of
elements from his own personal experience and from his instruction at the university”
(Kolb, 28).
40
Forde, 58.
41
Kolb, 53. Luther states, “It is the fault, therefore, of the instruments, which God
does not allow to be idle, that evil things are done, with God himself setting them in motion. It is just as if a carpenter were cutting badly with a chipped and jagged ax. Hence it
comes about that the ungodly man cannot but continually err and sin, because he is
caught up in the movement of divine power and not allowed to be idle, but wills, desires,
and acts according to the kind of person he himself is” (Luther, Career of the Reformer
III, 176).
42
Packer and Johnston, 49. Notice the fluctuation between God and Satan as the
controller of the will.
43
Packer and Johnston state that “If man could choose his own rider, his will would
indeed be free, and he would be sovereign over his own salvation” (ibid., 53). However,
the Bible does speak of resisting the devil (James 4:7).
44
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 97.
45
Ibid.

281

JOURNAL OF THE ADVENTIST THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY
Erasmus’ point, Luther refuses to wrestle with this issue. “It should be
enough to simply say that God has willed . . . and the reason of the Divine will is not to be sought, but simply to be adored.”46
Luther’s View of Soteriology
The Human Condition. The condition of humanity is foundational
to Luther’s view of salvation, especially the total depravity of man’s nature (Gen 6:5,21).47 This is a primary basis for his soteriology. He states,
“If we believe that Christ has redeemed human creatures by his blood,
we are bound to confess that the whole human being was lost. Otherwise,
we should make Christ either superfluous or the redeemer of only the
lowest part of humanity . . . and that would be blasphemy and sacrilege.”48 Further, he writes, “salvation is not of our own strength or counsel, but depends on the working of God alone . . . does it not clearly follow that when God is not present to work in us, all is evil, and of necessity we act in a way that contributes nothing towards salvation?”49 This
view of salvation is tied to his belief in justification by faith in which
“God does everything necessary for salvation.”50 Thus, there is no part
that man plays in his own salvation. For Luther, anything man could do
would only detract from the glory of God. Rather, “‘the best, infallible
preparation for grace, and the only disposing factor for its reception, is
God’s eternal choosing and predestination.’”51 Therefore, “man’s destiny

46

Ibid., 100. For an interesting view that Erasmus’ fate was to lay the groundwork
for this reformatory work, see Terrence M. Reynolds, “Was Erasmus Responsible for
Luther?: A Study of the Relationship of the Two Reformers and Their Clash over the
Question of the Will,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 41/4 (1977): 18-34.
47
The will is completely evil and in bondage. “The whole man is captured by sin,
not just certain portions of man” (Mark Migotti, “Luther’s Word on Man’s Will: A Case
Study in Comparative Intellectual History,” Religious Studies 20/D (1984): 660).
48
Luther, Career of the Reformer III, 293. On the importance of the view of the sinfulness of sin for postmodernity, see a brief but nuanced discussion by Kathryn A. Kleinhans, “The Bondage of the Will as Good News for Postmodern Selves,” Dialog 39/2
(2000): 93-98.
49
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 102.
50
McGrath, 100.
51
Luther, Career of the Reformer III, 190. Some , like Kenneth Hagen, claim that
Luther did not hold the view of double predestination. Hagen writes, “Only in connection
with the doctrine of redemption is an evangelical doctrine of predestination possible”
(Kenneth Hagen, “Luther’s Understanding of the Bondage of the Will, and the Problem
of Free Will in Melanchthon and Later Theologians,” Reformation & Revival 7/4 (1998):
139. Moreover, he writes, “while He [God] creates in man the possibility to believe, the
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depends entirely upon the free decision of God.”52 Luther considered this
belief in a bound will “the corner-stone of the gospel and the very foundation of faith.”53
Grace and Divine Mercy. In Luther’s theology it is supremely clear
that humans cannot be saved unless the grace of God works in them. For
“nothing we do has any saving significance prior to His working in us.”54
There is no place for the will in matters of salvation, but only grace.
Erasmus holds man has free will and simultaneously allows that grace is
needed for man to will good. Luther finds this inconsistent, saying, “man
without grace cannot will good . . . so there is found in your ‘free-will’ at
the same moment a yes and a no”55 Yet, might there be room for a will
that can accept or reject the grace of God? For Luther, to allow this
would be an offense to the power of God’s grace. “If God’s grace is
wanting, if it is taken away from that small power [of the will that Erasmus posits] what can it do?”56 On the contrary, humans can do nothing
without God’s grace. “Hence, it follows that “free will” without God’s
grace is not free at all, but is the permanent prisoner and bondslave of
evil.”57 There is no halfway between salvation and damnation. “For if
God is in us, Satan is out of us, and then it is present with us to will only
good.”58 Thus grace is all in all.
He also raises the issue of meritorious works. This exemplifies his
overarching concern about faith versus works and his dispute with Roman Catholicism. He will not allow any salvific part to the will, for this
might mean the will has somehow merited salvation. He states, “if ‘freewill’ merits a ‘tiny bit’, and grace the rest, why does ‘free-will’ receive
the total reward?”59 Even the slightest will in man becomes, for him, salvation by works. He leaves no room for unmerited grace as a gift that can
be accepted or rejected. It is clear, then, that Luther felt he needed to
ability to reject remains” (Hagen, 140). However, Hagen does not cite Luther on this
point, and Luther suggests much to the contrary throughout The Bondage of the Will.
52
Packer and Johnston, 53.
53
Ibid., 43.
54
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 102.
55
Ibid., 145. He continues his critique of Erasmus and finds it inconsistent that
“though [the will] by its own power it can only go down, and can go up only with the
help of another” (ibid., 143).
56
Ibid., 104.
57
Ibid. There seems to be lacking here a distinction between power and will which
might be a helpful nuance.
58
Ibid., 147.
59
Ibid., 237.
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deny free will to maintain the sovereignty of God’s grace, and thus the
whole basis of his theology, “for this was the real matter under debate.” 60
Because of his concept of salvation, central to his reforms, he was
obliged to “uphold the absolute necessity of God’s grace for every human act that has any relevance for salvation.”61 There is no place for contingency; all is performed by the will and the power of God. The will is
bound, and thus, salvation is bestowed solely by God, with no input from
the human will. Luther states, “to believers he [God] gives the righteousness of God; to unbelievers he [God] denies it.”62
Luther’s Biblical Interpretation
Luther relies on many texts to support his interpretation of the bondage of the will. Some prominent ones include “I know whom I have chosen” (John 13:18) and “The Lord knoweth them that are his” (2 Tim
2:19).63 This, coupled with Luther’s view of foreknowledge as God’s
decree, asserts a predestinarian view of salvation. He also references
Isaiah 46:10, “Declaring the end from the beginning, And from ancient
times things that are not yet done, Saying, ‘My counsel shall stand, And I
will do all My pleasure.” Moreover, God made “promises before the
world began” and “whom he will he hardeneth” (Tit 1:2; Rom 9:18,22).
Luther also references the narrative of Balaam in Num 22, claiming it as
proof against free will. “Thus Balaam’s inability to say what he wished is
a clear proof from the Scriptures that man is not in his own power, nor
free in choosing and doing what he does. Were it not so, no such case
could stand in the Scriptures.”64
Love of Jacob, Hatred of Esau. Luther finds some of his most
prominent examples in Rom 9. He begins by discussing Romans 9:13,
where God declares “Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.” Luther
comments, “God chose Jacob and chose him before he was born . . . He
60
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man, in the last analysis, saves himself” (Packer and Johnston, 49). Forde agrees saying,
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so hated Esau that He removed his place of abode in the desert.”65 This is
a primary proof for the decrees of God. Luther goes on to accuse Israel
of being ungrateful for the grace of God. “I know that men are grafted in
by faith and cut off by unbelief, and that they must be exhorted to believe, lest they be cut off. But it does not hence follow, nor does this
prove, that they can believe or disbelieve by the power of ‘free-will’,
which is the point we are discussing.”66 Even still, he holds that we have
no will either to believe or not to believe. “Paul teaches that faith and
unbelief come to us by no work of our own, but through the love and
hatred of God.”67
Pharaoh. Luther also utilizes the hardening of Pharaoh that Paul
speaks of in Romans 9. He writes that Pharaoh “allowed his own ungodly corruption, under Satan’s sway, to blaze with anger, to swell with
pride, to boil with rage and to advance along the path of scornful recklessness.”68 This would not have occurred without the effective will of
God, for “His evil will would not have been moved or hardened of itself,
but as the omnipotent Agent makes it act . . .”69 Thus God acts on Pharaoh’s heart. “God presents from without to his villainous heart that which
by nature he hates; at the same time, He continues by omnipotent action
to move within him the evil which he finds there.”70 Notice that God is
the causative agent, yet from within; this helps us understand Luther’s
concept that the will is not compelled, yet at the same time, in bondage.
Erasmus, contrastingly, holds that “God hardens when He does not
straightway punish the sinner.”71 But, for Luther, under the decree of
God Pharaoh had no choice but to be hardened. If it were not so, “God
could not with such certainty have foretold his hardening.”72 Thus, he
65
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must have caused it. “If He [God] cannot lie, then Pharaoh cannot but be
hardened.”73
The Potter and the Clay. On Paul’s reference to the potter and the
clay in Romans 9:19-23, Luther states, “He is speaking of men, comparing them to clay, and God to a potter.”74 Thus, God is the only agent in
this operation, and the clay cannot form itself. Erasmus appeals to the
other places where this metaphor arises in the OT, but Luther rejects this
approach. He writes, “Paul does not appear to have taken this passage
from the prophets . . .”75 Yet, it is clear that Paul is alluding to the prominent OT appearances of this metaphor. Nevertheless, for Luther this passage shows the omnipotence of God and absolute lack of free will in
man. It is obvious that we are the clay and don’t control our circumstances, “for there is no doubt that afflictions come from God against our
will, and impose on us necessity of bearing them.”76 Thus, Luther considers his position to be on firm biblical footing. According to his methodology, Romans 9 alone would give him enough proof of his position.
Issues in Luther’s View of the Human Will
Foreknowledge and Free Will. Luther sees the problem strictly as
“whether God foresees anything contingently, or whether we do all
things of necessity.”77 Luther is explicit in his answer that “God foreknows nothing contingently, but that He foresees, purposes, and does all
things according to His own immutable, eternal, and infallible will.”78 In
other words, His foreknowledge is bound to His decree—they are the
same. He admits that there is an illusion of free will. Yet, “however it
73
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may appear to us to be done mutably and contingently, it is in reality
done necessarily and immutably in respect of God’s will.”79 Luther, accordingly, asks how one who believes in contingency can believe God’s
promises. Further, Luther asks the question, “Do you suppose that He
does not will what He foreknows, or that he does not foreknow what He
wills?”80 Luther sees no will that thwarts God’s will, all happens according to God’s determining.
He takes the case of Judas to illustrate his point:
If God foreknew that Judas would be a traitor, Judas became a
traitor of necessity, and it was not in the power of Judas or of
any creature to act differently, or to change his will, from that
which God had foreseen. It is true that Judas acted willingly,
and not under compulsion, but his willing was the work of
God, brought into being by His omnipotence, like everything
else.81

He goes on to assert “it would certainly be a hard question, I allow—
indeed, an insoluble one—if you sought to establish both the foreknowledge of God and the freedom of man together.”82 Moreover, he states,
“Either God makes mistakes in His foreknowledge, and errors in His action (which is impossible), or else we act, and are caused to act, according to foreknowledge and action.”83 This is in accord with Luther’s view
of necessity, the will and foreknowledge of God are bound up together in
His decrees. Nevertheless, “Judas betrayed Christ willingly. My point is
that this act of will in Judas was certainly infallibly bound to take place,
if God foreknew it.”84 Therefore, there was no other alternative, for “how
could Judas change his will while God’s infallible foreknowledge
stands?”85 When Luther states that Judas sinned willingly, he does not
mean that Judas could have done otherwise, but simply that he did what
was in his will to do. This does not refer to freedom, but the nuance of
lack of compulsion.
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However, is it true that God’s foreknowledge must deprive man of
freedom? Must contingency and freedom injure God’s foreknowledge?86
For Luther, the answer is yes. However, consider this example. A free
agent may choose to read this or choose not to read this. That God knows
you would read this does not necessarily entail that you have no choice.
The perceived problem is that if God knew before what you would do,
then you have no choice in the present. However, the problem is not the
perfect knowledge of your action, but the timing of the action.87 Rather,
if the problem is conceived from a different angle, it may be that if you
would not read this, God would have known you would not read it. In
other words, God would not be in error in His foreknowledge, but He
would foreknow your free decisions themselves.88 Nevertheless, because
86
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of Luther’s definition of foreknowledge as nearly synonymous with the
will and of omnipotence as causation of every action in the world, he
must hold this view: “If the foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are
admitted, then we must be under necessity.”89
Divine Will and Human Responsibility. Luther’s rejection of any
freedom of the will begs the question, is it coherent to assert that the human will is bound and that it is responsible for sin and deserving of punishment? How can one be morally responsible for one’s actions, if they
are the only actions one could take? Luther comments:
I say that man without the grace of God nonetheless remains
under the general omnipotence of the God who effects, moves,
and impels all things in a necessary, infallible course; but the
fact of man’s thus being carried along is ‘nothing’—that is,
avails nothing in God’s sight, nor is reckoned anything but
sin.90

All humans are responsible for their own actions and sinners deserving of punishment. Luther allows “merely that the creature co-operates
with the operation of God!”91 He goes on to state, “Paul co-operates with
God in teaching the Corinthians; he preaches without, and God teaches
within. The work of each is in that case distinct.”92 Moreover, “all things,
even the ungodly, co-operate with God.”93 Luther is thus not always consistent in his pastoral concerns about the will. For instance, he often
speaks as though the will can be negatively affected by the writings of
Erasmus. He also states, “For as long as they do not know the limits of
their ability, they will not know what they should do, they cannot repent
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when they err . . .”94 Elsewhere he counsels, “‘If you accept the gospel
and God’s Word and cling to it and grasp it, and remain faithful to the
end, then you will be saved, and if not, you will be damned, 2 Timothy
2:[12].”95 This seems to imply that human beings have some control over
whether or not they will repent.96 However, this has already been categorically denied elsewhere.
Accordingly, this “co-operation” should not be confused with a free
operation on the human will’s part. Luther seems to only mean that humans are not compelled in their actions. Nonetheless, those actions are
willed by God, and the human will is bound in its course. The lack of
compulsion simply denotes the belief that humans don’t act against their
will because their will itself is bound.97 So, when a human acts, it is
never compelled against its will, yet the very will is controlled by God.
Consequently, human beings seem to merit their own punishment but
not reward. Yet, only “God makes believers righteous, and unbelievers
ungodly, unrighteous, under wrath.”98 Thus, Luther holds that humans
are justly condemned. The unrighteous deserve destruction, even though
they cannot do otherwise but be unrighteous. He states, “To say man
does not seek God, is the same as saying: man cannot seek God . . . If
there were potency or power in man to will good, the movement of Divine omnipotence would not suffer it to remain inactive or keep holiday.”99 How, then, can God be just if he arbitrarily selects, from eternity,
who will be saved and who will be damned? Kolb notes the enormity of
94
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this issue, saying, “The tension between the two defies solution, in spite
of the best efforts of human reason.”100 Luther is clear: “God, he says,
works every human deed, whether good or evil. He works in the evil man
according to that man’s nature, as He finds it.”101 Therefore all responsibility lies with God for good and for evil.
The Divine Will and the Will of Satan. There is some ambiguity in
regard to the relationship of Satan in Luther’s view. As part of his denial
of free will, Luther emphasizes Satan as holding the human will in bondage. He writes, “in all that bears on salvation or damnation, [one] has no
‘free-will,’ but is a captive, prisoner and bondslave, either to the will of
God, or to the will of Satan.”102 This theme runs throughout Luther’s polemic. He also states, “how mighty is the dominion and power of Satan
over the sons of men, which prevents them hearing and grasping the
plainest words of God.”103 Therefore man cannot be the cause of sin.
Rather, “the cause is the wickedness of Satan, who is enthroned and
reigns over us in our weakness, and who himself resists the Word of
God. If Satan did not do so, the whole world could be converted by a
single word of God, heard once; there would be no need of more.”104 So
Satan actively works against God. Does this mean that he has freedom?
Does he work against the immutable will of God? Luther acknowledges
that Satan blinds people, saying some “by reason, of the working of Satan, their god, cannot see the plainest proofs of the Trinity in the Godhead and of the humanity of Christ.”105 He goes on to say:
So the Word of God and the traditions of men fight each other
in implacable opposition. God and Satan are personally engaged in this same conflict, each labouring [sic] to destroy the
works and subvert the doctrines of the other, like two kings
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laying waste each other’s kingdoms. ‘He that is not with me,’
said Christ, ‘is against me.’ (Luke 11.23) 106

This is actually characterized by Luther as a real war; he states,
“there is no middle kingdom between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan, which are ever at war with each other.”107 Satan, in this
war, prevents man from choosing to serve God. “The power of ‘freewill’ amounts to this: because Satan rules over it, it rejects even grace,
and the Spirit who fulfils the law—so excellently do its own ‘endeavour’
and ‘effort’ avail to fulfil the law.”108
Yet how can Satan war against God? Would this not entail that Satan
has a free will of his own? If one applies the same rules to Satan’s will as
to the human will, this is impossible. If God determines all from eternity
past and is absolutely immutable, Satan can have no free will. Thus, in
order for Luther to be consistent, God must actually be controlling Satan,
and God Himself holds humans in bondage and is, in effect, working
against Himself. Is it possible to reconcile these seemingly opposed
viewpoints? Luther, contrary to what he elsewhere implies, admits that
God is behind the works of Satan, saying, “He moves and works of necessity even in Satan and the ungodly. But He works according to what
they are, and what He finds them to be: which means, since they are evil
and perverted themselves, that when they are impelled to action by this
movement of Divine omnipotence they do only that which is perverted
and evil.”109 Therefore, God’s omnipotence holds primacy, regardless of
the consequences for His character.
Luther himself acknowledges the apparent contradiction at this juncture. He says, “If I could by any means understand how this same God,
who makes such a show of wrath and unrighteousness, can yet be merciful and just, there would be no need for faith.”110 Thus, he seems resigned to the fact that he does not understand how God can be just, and at
the same time condemn humans to eternal death based only on His immutable will. This brings us to the problem of God’s justice, the problem
of theodicy which is tied to the doctrine of the human will.
106

Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 93.
Ibid., 253.
108
Ibid., 188.
109
Ibid., 204. Packer and Johnston write, “it is God who energises [sic] Satan, according to his nature, and such power as Satan has is held and exercised by God’s own
appointment” (Packer and Johnston, 51).
110
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 101.
107

292

PECKHAM: LUTHER’S VIEW OF THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL
The Problem of Theodicy. The question of free will is very closely
related to theodicy. There is a “persistent problem that arises when God
is seen as condemning those whom He wills not to save.”111 Luther acknowledges this difficulty but deflects the immediate question by focusing on the theology of the cross.112 Even amidst the question of God’s
justice, Luther “trusted that the God who had come to engage evil at its
ugliest on the cross would triumph finally over evil.”113 Yet, this does not
answer why God condemns some and saves others based on His will
alone. Luther himself struggles with this problem, saying:
And who would not stumble at it? I have stumbled at it myself
more than once, down to the deepest pit of despair, so that I
wished I had never been a man . . . this is why so much toil
and trouble has been devoted to clearing the goodness of God,
throwing the blame on man’s will.114

Luther admits the difficulty but cannot affirm free will, saying:
Though He saves so few and damns so many; to believe that
He is just, though of His own will He makes us perforce
proper subjects for damnation, and seems (in Erasmus’ words)
‘to delight in the torments of poor wretches and to be a fitter
object for hate than for love.’ 115

Even though it is beyond understanding, Luther asserts that when
“God saves those who don’t deserve it ‘man’s heart does not accuse . . .
nor demand to know why He wills to do so.’”116 But what about those
who are lost? He goes on to say:
Why then does He not alter those evil wills which He moves?
This question touches on the secrets of His majesty, where
‘His judgments are past finding out’ (cf. Rom. 11.33). It is not
for us to inquire into these mysteries, but to adore them. If
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flesh and blood take offence here, and grumble, well, let them
grumble.117

Luther’s contention that one ought not be troubled by this issue does
not seem satisfactory. The problem of evil and God’s justice is too real
and present to dismiss lightly. The problem was very real for Luther, and
he honestly had no satisfactory answer, but he believed in the goodness
of God by faith. Luther’s faith in God is admirable, but the question of
God’s goodness still remains.
The Hidden God. How did Luther attempt to conceive of the justice
of God? The main attempt is the concept of the deus absconditus, the
hidden God. Roland Bainton states that for Luther, “there are almost two
Gods, the inscrutable God whose ways are past finding out and the God
made known to us in Christ.”118 Luther seemingly retained the idea of
God hidden as vestige “from his Ockhamist instructors” that God is beyond human grasp.119 God is unknowable beyond what is revealed, and,
thus, hidden.120 God revealed is found primarily in the incarnation. Luther imagines Jesus saying, “‘from an unrevealed God I will become a
revealed God. Nevertheless, I will remain the same God. I will be made
flesh, or send My Son . . .’”121
Luther holds Isaiah 45:7 as an example that God creates evil. It says,
“I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the
117
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LORD do all these things.” However, this evil might be understood as
being in contrast to peace, often meaning prosperity and calamity. This
need not be in reference to ontological evil.122 Yet Luther is unconvinced; he holds that God Himself creates evil and good in His hidden
will, hence He is the author not just of goodness, but also of evil. “Thus
God conceals His eternal mercy and loving kindness beneath eternal
wrath, His righteousness beneath unrighteousness.”123 How are we to
understand this internal dualism in God’s nature? Can it be reconciled
with the justice of God? In Ezekiel 18:32, God Himself declares His desire for life, not death, “For I have no pleasure in the death of him that
dieth.”124 Erasmus says “If He does not will our death, it must be laid to
the charge of our own will if we perish.”125
Here is Luther’s response to the biblical statement:
Ezekiel speaks of the published offer of God’s mercy, not of
the dreadful hidden will of God, Who, according to His own
counsel, ordains such persons as He wills to receive and partaken of the mercy preached and offered. This will is not to be
inquired into, but to be reverently adored, as by far the most
awesome secret of the Divine Majesty. He has kept it to Himself, and forbidden us to know it; and it is much more worthy
of reverence than an infinite number of Corycian caverns! 126

So, must it be assumed that God is not here speaking the whole
truth? Is the “published offer” of God different from His real will? But to
avoid further consideration of this incongruency, Luther counsels that we
122
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should not think of these things. “Wherever God hides Himself, and wills
to be unknown to us, there we have no concern.”127 He claims the problem lies in the interpreter that “makes no distinction between God
preached and God hidden.”128 However, the Bible seems to make the opposite distinction, that God is always the same. Malachi 3:6 asserts that
God is not arbitrary, but that men can take confidence in His perfect
character, “For I am the Lord, I change not.” Yet, in order to try to harmonize God’s call to sinners in Scripture and a lack of will in man, he
uses the construction of two different wills in one God. “Thus, He does
not will the death of a sinner—that is, in His word, but He wills it by His
inscrutable will.”129 Gerrish comments that this view has the “fearful cost
of reducing the universal benevolence of the revealed will to a mere appearance.”130 Beyond this, by the very principle of Scripture as a basis
for all doctrine, by sola scriptura itself, God “in His word” is the standard. How can we say regarding God the opposite of what He says about
Himself in the Bible? Thus it is very problematic to claim two wills in
God and leaves the problem of theodicy in full force.
Analysis of Biblical Support
It is important to look at Luther’s use of biblical texts to support his
doctrine about the bondage of the will. Do his texts clearly teach this
doctrine? As we consider his use of Scripture we should note, as Justo
Gonzalez puts it, that “Luther felt free to take certain liberties with the
canon of Scripture, while still insisting on the primacy of Scripture over
tradition.”131 As we saw earlier, Luther reinterpreted the “righteousness
of God” to refer to His impartation of righteousness alone. He came to
this understanding by utilizing the questionable methodology of the “tropological sense” of Scripture.132 Furthermore, Gonzalez states, Luther
127
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“felt free to confess that he was inclined to toss [James] out of the canon
. . . Therefore, Luther was no biblicist. His primary authority was not the
canon of the Bible, but the gospel that he found in the Bible and that was
the touchstone for its interpretation.”133
We have seen many texts that Luther uses to support his doctrine; let
us now examine these.134 Luther’s use of Romans 9 as a proof of predestination is widely disputed. For instance, the context seems to refer not to
the question of how people are saved but to the question of whether God
has lived up to His promises to His chosen people Israel. Thus, by referring to God’s loving Jacob, Paul is pointing to the fact that Israel was
chosen by God through no merit of its own.135 Israel has no claim to exclusivity because God is free to bestow mercy on whom He will, specifically, to the Gentiles. Yet, He has not rejected Israel, but the Gentiles
also will be “grafted in.” Christ has made a way for anyone to come to
Christ. Thus, seemingly, the passage lends itself to a widening of the
availability of salvation rather than God’s choosing of whom He will
save and whom He will damn.
The narrative of Pharaoh’s hardening is also very interesting. Luther
holds God as moving evil within Pharaoh and moving upon Him from
without in circumstances. It does not seem that the text necessitates holding that God controlled Pharaoh’s will, as the hardening can simply mean
that God worked through circumstance to push Pharaoh’s hand towards
decision. Moreover, it should be recognized that the Bible not only says
God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, but also that Pharaoh hardened his own
heart (See Ex 8:15,32; 9:34; 1 Sam 6:6) .
The potter and the clay metaphor is also very important to note. This
is clearly an allusion by Paul to the OT metaphor, which does not seem
to have predestinarian overtones. God is clearly affirmed as omnipotent,
He is the Creator and the shaper, and in comparison to him humans are
like clay.136 The analogy need not be stretched so far that we are viewed
as inanimate like clay. Clay is dead, humans are living. The preface to
133
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Jeremiah 18 uses the potter and the clay example and proceeds to lay out
the conditional response of God based on the people’s choice (Jer 18:710).137 Surely, God’s power is emphasized in this imagery, but not to the
point of complete impotence of the human. The metaphor need not be
interpreted as determinist to be consistent with its own context in both
Paul and the OT (See also 2 Tim 2:21).
Finally, a little might be said about the case of Balaam. First, this is
an exceptional case in Scripture and is not necessarily a paradigm for
God’s operation. Nevertheless, Balaam’s will is thwarted by God’s
power. Balaam desires to curse Israel and ends up blessing Israel. First, it
should be remembered that Balaam claimed to speak for God. Thus, it
could be suggested that this circumstance qualified the situation, since
Balaam did not have the right to claim to speak for God and thereby injure others. Moreover, there was nothing that God overruled which
would keep Balaam from salvation. In other words, by God intervening
and overpowering Balaam’s will He injured neither Balaam, nor his opportunity for salvation.138
We have seen the texts Luther uses to support his position, but what
about those that seem to disagree with his view? One example is Matt
23:37, where Jesus states, “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the
prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I
have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens
under her wings, and ye would not!” This text suggests that it is God’s
will that Jerusalem be spared and that man’s will is to blame. Luther responds, “why the Majesty does not remove or change this fault of will in
every man . . . or why He lays this fault to the charge of the will, when
man cannot avoid it, it is not lawful to ask.”139 But why is it not lawful to
ask? The text asserts that the situation is not Jesus’ will. Luther tries to
137
For further analysis of this passage, see John C. Peckham, “The Passible Potter
and the Contingent Clay: An Exegetical and Theological Analysis of Jeremiah 18:1-10,”
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society, 18/1 (2007): 130–150.
138
The question may be asked why God doesn’t overrule all wills for salvation. If
God were to overrule all wills, than free will would be obsolete, as Luther claims. This
would mean that no one can freely enter into a love relationship with God. The Creator
does not desire automatons, or robots, but beings that can love and be loved. I have suggested that God may have overruled Balaam’s speech in this case, and without contradicting His policy of free will, based at least partly on Balaam’s presumption to speak for
God and the nature of the case. This does not mean that God arbitrarily overrules wills
whenever He pleases; the weight of Scripture is to the contrary of this notion.
139
Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 171.

298

PECKHAM: LUTHER’S VIEW OF THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL
reconcile this text with his own view, saying, “He [God] has granted him
[man] a free use of things at his own will, and not hedged him in with
any laws of commands.”140 Nevertheless, to be consistent with Luther’s
other statements, God still must have decreed the human will, and so this
falls short as a solution. This and other passages seem to require some
freedom of the human will to make any sense.
There are many other places where prophets, or God, or Jesus plead
with people to repent and to come to Him. There are also many conditional statements that those who believe will be saved (i.e. John 3:16).
There is also another prominent example of texts that suggest free will in
the Bible. Notice Luther’s treatment of Matt 19:17, which says, “if thou
wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.” Luther does not accept the
text as it reads, but revises it to be in accordance with a will in bondage.
His revision states “if ever thou shalt have the will to keep the commandments (which you will have, not of yourself, but of God, who gives
it to whom He will), then they also shall preserve thee.” This is not what
the text says, but is indicative of Luther’s interpretation of conditional
statements.
McSorley states, “In the course of his argument against Erasmus, Luther lays down a principle which forces him to stand alone in the history
of Christian biblical interpretation.”141 He dismisses all of these texts
based on a single grammatical argument. He states derisively that “a
conditional statement asserts nothing indicatively.”142 In other words,
God’s call for man to do something doesn’t mean that man can do it, it
does not imply ability to act. McSorley reacts that this is “clearly exaggerated and one-sided because it ignores the rules of personal dialogue.”143 In other words, this rule cannot really sweep away all the
pleadings of God with man throughout the Bible. Why would God make
so many calls for repentance in the Bible? Luther claims it is “so as to
bring him [man] by experience of himself to a knowledge of his disease
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or weakness, to which he cannot lead him by any other course.”144 So it
seems the call is to provoke the sinner, but what good can provocation
even do for one who has no power of the will? In response to the common assertion that this would mean God is mocking us, Luther replies,
“Why should not this conclusion follow rather: therefore, God is trying
us, that by His law He may bring us to a knowledge of our impotence.”145
Thus these exhortations tell us, “not what we can do, but what we ought
to do.”146 However, this is against a multitude of evidence to the contrary. The clear reading of the texts are that God genuinely desires all to
be saved (2 Pet 3:9; Tit 2:11; 1 Tim 2:4) and that they can come to Him
if they will choose to do so.
It is interesting to note, however, that Luther, in his final translation
in the German Bible (1546) of 1 Tim 2:4 actually changed the word
sw¿zw, literally “saved,” to “helped.”147 On this translation Lowell Green
comments, “Therefore, (a) God wills all people to receive help for their
temporal needs; (b) God wills all people to know that he alone is the
source of all temporal good.”148 Luther states, “Accordingly, when we
make a distinction of salvation between faithful and faithless people, we
must draw from those passages this conclusion, that Paul here refers to
general salvation.”149 For Luther, this verse does not speak of salvation
meaning eternal life, but refers to temporal helps and general knowledge.
Luther is right in asserting that these calls do not mean “that these
things can be done by our own strength!”150 Yet, what if God makes it
possible for man to repent in God’s own strength? Luther says of these
invitations to turn, “it does not follow from this that man is converted by
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his own power.”151 This is unchallenged, even by Erasmus, but Luther
still considers free will to necessarily mean omnipotent and unassisted
will, which confuses the issue. Affirming this limited free will to respond
to the biblical call to repentance does not mean that humans can save
themselves, but that God has offered grace and has made provision so
that they can choose to accept that grace.152 The gift is no less free because it has been willingly accepted. Thus, it seems that the matter of the
definition of freedom, specifically the extent of free will, greatly contributes to the conflict.
Conclusion
Martin Luther stands as a pillar of faith and reform, and Christianity
owes a great debt of gratitude to his faith and courage in standing up
against persecution for a biblical faith in Jesus Christ. This paper has focused on but one part of Luther’s theology, and narrowly at one aspect of
Luther’s view of justification by faith. This should not be taken as a rebuke of Luther, his reforms, or his whole theology, but as a wrestling
with the need for further reform and theological diligence. It is apparent
that Luther was sincere and faithful in his desire to protect God’s sovereignty and grace from injury. That God sent His Son to save us is at the
heart of Luther’s argument, as it should be in all biblical theology.
Many understandable factors contributed to Luther’s predestinarian
view, including his experience with a works-based faith, the polemic
context with Erasmus, and his belief that free will was against the gospel
in the writings of Paul.153 Luther’s doctrine of the will might have been
quite different if it had developed outside of the polemic concept against
Erasmus and works righteousness in the reform movement. Luther was
also very influenced by Augustine’s writings on predestination, themselves products of the polemic with Pelagius and a neoplatonic ontology.
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Luther sincerely desired to protect grace from anything that might undermine it. This may have clouded his ability to see the meaning in passages such as 1 Tim 2:4. Theologians of today can learn a great lesson
from this. There is always a danger in pure polemics. Often positions are
defended and stretched beyond their biblical basis in the heat of debate.
We should remember to take a step back and examine our own presuppositions and honestly engage the thoughts of those who differ from our
interpretation. Luther was often not granted the freedom of this option.
He was constantly facing persecution, even death, and to give any
ground would have seemed to him like compromise. Thus, I believe we
can understand where Luther was coming from, even if we may not
agree with his conclusions on the human will.
Luther’s view on the will is not always a coherent picture regarding
the God of the Bible. As McSorley states, Luther’s refusal to allow any
“misuse of free will” in the fall makes him “affirm the justice of God
while at the same time affirming that God condemns those who are unfree and who therefore are not deserving of condemnation.”154 This is a
blight on the character of God and a danger to people who might give up
any thought of turning to God in despair at such a doctrine.
Of course, Luther is absolutely correct that no one deserves grace,
but what separates those who receive condemnation? Does God really
only give grace to some? Is Jesus Christ’s death only applicable to some,
or did he die for all? These questions have raged throughout the centuries
of Christian history and continue to be topics of debate. Luther’s proposed solution, the hiddenness of God, implies a duality in God which is
beyond understanding. But if the hidden God is unknown, why does Luther have so much to attribute to the hiddenness of God? It would be
more congruent with Luther’s methodology if he would stick to what is
said about the revealed God.155 In revelation, God is said to be the Savior
and He is spoken of as a God of judgment. Thus, both poles are spoken
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in the revelation about God, thus about the revealed God.156 The Bible
claims of this same God that He “is not willing that any should perish” (2
Pet 3:9). How is this reconcilable with the idea of a God that wills only
some to be saved?157 It is not, unless God is viewed as different in His
hiddenness than in His revelation.158 But what would this then say about
His revelation?
Further, it seems that Luther’s conclusion that only some receive
grace is utterly connected to his conception of God’s sovereign grace. If
grace is irresistible, then only those who receive grace are consequently
saved. But if, contrary to this, grace is not irresistible, God could theoretically offer grace to all, even though all might not accept it. The Bible
claims also that God desires all men to be saved (2 Pet 3:9, Titus 2, 1
Tim 2) and draws all to Himself (John 12:32). If it is God’s will that all
be saved, surely every person has the opportunity for salvation. Luther
once acknowledged this, saying, “God wants all to be saved and participate in his eternal bliss (1 Tim 2:4). God does not want sinners to die but
to be turned to him and live (Ezek. 18:32). Thus, Luther’s correspondent
should know, God’s grace is without limit toward those who trust in
him.”159 In saying this, however, Luther did not give up his predestinarian view.160 Luther felt a burden to uphold the depravity of the will
and feared any conception of freedom, meaning neutrality of the will. 161
Luther was right to react against a works-based salvation and a belief that
man could save himself without God’s grace. However, is it not possible
that the neutrality of the will can be denied, the fall and effects of sin on
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man can be affirmed, and God can grant each sinner opportunity and
ability to respond to the gospel?
A potential solution to this paradox might be an amendment of the
view of the reception of grace with a possibility to refuse God’s grace.
Without such a nuance, one is left with utter determinism. Furthermore,
if there is no choice, even unmeritorious, included in salvation, then it
seems difficult to see God as the righteous judge. If God predestines the
will, apart from any human contribution, then the fall of man was God’s
responsibility. If He does not, then the option is given to choose to serve
or not to serve Him. The latter seems to be in accord with God’s call for
repentance throughout the Bible.
Allowing the human will a choice in salvation would still preserve a
serious view of the sinfulness and depravity that has attached itself to
human nature after the fall. In this model, man’s freedom does not consist of power to overcome sin solely by his own will, but only through
the power of God offered freely as a gift. The acceptance of the gift is
not meritorious, and salvation is not earned. Moreover, God’s omnipotence is not damaged, for it is His power that He extends to creation,
granting them the actual power to effect history. His power is no less
because He chooses not to overrule all wills but His own. Rather, His
power is extended as it manifests itself in love. Through Jesus Christ,
God’s power is “made perfect in weakness” (2 Cor 12:9). Far from
meaning that man can save himself, God shows that man can only be
saved through Jesus Christ, and He beckons the weary to come to Him
(Matt 11:28-30). The actuality and power of this very choice is explicit
in a most famous text of the Bible, “For God so loved the world that He
gave His only begotten son, that whoever believes in Him should not
perish but have everlasting life (John 3:16).”
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